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TITLE IX AND TITLE VII:
PARALLEL REMEDIES IN COMBATTING
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT
LYNN RIDGEWAY ZEHRT*
The federal circuit courts of appeals are divided over the proper
relationship between Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments Act of 1972
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the federal courts
disagree over whether an employee of an educational institution may sue her
employer for employment discrimination under either Title IX or Title VII.
Some courts have concluded that these employees may not bring employment
discrimination claims under Title IX, holding that Title VII provides the sole
avenue for obtaining monetary relief for employment discrimination against
educational institutions. Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion,
holding that Title IX and Title VII constitute parallel remedies, thus permitting
claimants to recover monetary damages against educational institutions by
pursuing only a Title IX claim for employment discrimination. Claimants
proceeding under the parallel approach have a distinct advantage because by
proceeding solely under Title IX, they may avoid the administrative process
required by Title VII, as well as Title VII’s cap on compensatory and punitive
damages.
The Article concludes that only the parallel approach is consistent with
Title IX’s legislative history and purpose. In reaching this conclusion, the
Article closely examines the 1970 hearings held in the House Subcommittee of
Education. The Supreme Court acknowledged in North Haven Board of
Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982), that the origins of Title IX grew out of
these hearings. This legislative history is crucial in understanding the purpose
of Title IX, but it has not been fully explored in previous scholarship.
These 1970 hearings were historical for many reasons, including that they
are widely acknowledged to be the first congressional hearings held on the
education and employment of women in educational institutions. They
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Law. LL.M., with distinction, Georgetown Law Center; J.D., magna cum laude, University of
Alabama School of Law. This author dedicates this Article to her two daughters, Madeline and
Elizabeth. This author also appreciates the contributions of her research assistant, Alyssa Johnson.
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documented systemic employment discrimination by educational institutions
against women, including widespread discrimination in hiring, promotions,
and salaries. Given the pervasiveness of this employment discrimination and
the recognized inefficiency of the administrative process available at that time,
this Article concludes that Congress intended Title IX to provide an additional
remedy for combatting sex discrimination for these employees.
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 702
II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TITLE VII AND TITLE IX ............ 705
A. Title VII’s Origin and Structure .................................................... 705
B. Title IX’s General Language and Judicial Expansion ................... 710
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B. Title IX and Title VII are Parallel Remedies ................................ 723
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT
CONGRESS INTENDED TITLE IX TO SERVE AS A PARALLEL REMEDY
FOR EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE IX .................................... 728
V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 744

I. INTRODUCTION
Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments Acts of 1972 broadly and
boldly prohibits sex discrimination in any federally funded educational
program.1 Although its core antidiscrimination provisions consist of less than
forty words, the interpretation of these words has been the source of eight
Supreme Court decisions2 and multiple administrative interpretations through
formal regulations3 and less formal guidance manuals.4 The text of Title IX
1. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2012)).
2. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512
(1982); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S.
60 (1992); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005); Fitzgerald v.
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
3. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.51(a)(1) (2018) (regulations issued by the Office for Civil Rights,
Dep’t of Educ.); 45 C.F.R. § 86.51(a)(1) (2018) (regulations issued by the Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs.); 7 C.F.R. §§ 15a.500–50 (2018) (regulations issued by the Dep’t of Agric.); 13 C.F.R. § 113.3
(2018) (regulations issued by the Small Bus. Admin.).
4. See Title IX Legal Manual, § IV.B.2, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (last visited Aug. 6, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix [https://perma.cc/6TNZ-GLTT].
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contains only one express remedy: the denial of federal funding to any
educational institution that violates its provisions.5 The Supreme Court
expanded the effectiveness of Title IX significantly in 1979 when it read an
implied private right of action into the statute,6 thus placing enforcement power
into the hands of aggrieved individuals. Thirteen years later, when the Court
interpreted Title IX to authorize the recovery of compensatory damages for
intentional discrimination,7 the statute was transformed yet again into a more
powerful weapon for individuals challenging sex discrimination. Not only have
these interpretations of Title IX expanded the power of the statute, but they also
have incentivized the filing of Title IX claims not just in the traditional context
of student athletics but also in the field of employment discrimination. The
application of Title IX into the field of employment discrimination has created,
in turn, the present controversial judicial task of defining the relationship
between Title IX and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8
The majority of federal circuit courts view Title IX as an independent
remedy to Title VII in combatting sex discrimination in educational
employment.9 In Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center,10 the Third Circuit
recently considered whether an employee of an educational institution receiving
federal funds can sue this employer to recover damages for sex discrimination
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.11 The Third Circuit
broadly construed the statute, concluding that Title IX prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of sex,12 and thereby joined with the First,13
Fourth,14 and Sixth15 Circuits in concluding that Title IX encompassed such
claims. By interpreting Title IX as an additional and independent remedy to
Title VII, these courts further broadened Title IX’s enforcement power by

5. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
6. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699 (permitting a female student to bring an enforcement action
under Title IX by recognizing an implied private right of action into the statute).
7. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
8. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012)).
9. See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3rd Cir. 2017); Ivan v. Kent State Univ.,
92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir.
1994); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
10. 850 F.3d at 545.
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
12. Doe, 850 F.3d at 560.
13. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 881.
14. Preston, 31 F.3d at 203.
15. Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996).
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placing it in the hands of teachers and other employees of educational
institutions who seek monetary recovery for more than just retaliation.16
The Fifth Circuit17 and Seventh Circuit18 have taken a much narrower view
of Title IX, holding that Title IX does not provide a private right of action to
employees of qualifying educational institutions when these employees seek
damages for intentional sex discrimination committed in the employment
context. Instead, these Circuits have held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 196419 provides the “exclusive avenue of relief” for damages to these
employees.20 Emphasizing the comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme
Congress created when enacting Title VII,21 including filing deadlines,
exhaustion of administrative requirements as prerequisites to individual suits,
and limitations placed on the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages,
these courts have concluded that Title IX may not be used as a vehicle to bypass
Title VII’s requirements.22 A majority of the federal district courts find this
view persuasive, and for more than twenty years, these courts have effectively
dismissed parallel claims brought under Title IX on the ground that these claims
are preempted by Title VII.23
16. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005) (interpreting Title IX’s
prohibition of intentional discrimination to include a claim for retaliation brought by a former high
school basketball coach).
17. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995).
18. Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other
grounds by Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
20. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753; accord Waid, 91 F.3d at 862 (concluding that “Title VII provided
the only way by which [plaintiff] could obtain make-whole relief.”).
21. Waid, 91 F.3d at 861–62; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754.
22. Waid, 91 F.3d at 862; Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753.
23. The following 12 district courts have concluded that Title VII is the exclusive remedy for
employees seeking monetary relief for sex discrimination from their educational employers. Drisin v.
Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 1:16-cv-24939-WILLIAMS/TORRES, 2017 WL 3505299 (S.D. Fla.
June 27, 2017); Torres v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cty., No. 8:14-cv-1021-T-33TBM, 2014 WL 4185364
(M.D. Fla. Aug 22, 2014); Ludlow v. Nw. Univ., 79 F. Supp. 3d 824 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Vandiver v.
Little Rock Sch. Dist., No. 4:03-CV-00834 GTE, 2007 WL 2973463 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 9, 2007); Schultz
v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of W. Fla., No. 3:06cv442-RS-MD, 2007 WL 1490714 (N.D. Fla. May 21,
2007); Hankinson v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 6:04-CV-71 (HL), 2005 WL 6802243 (M.D. Ga.
Oct. 28, 2005); Urie v. Yale Univ., 331 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004); Morris v. Wallace Cmty.
Coll.–Selma, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (S.D. Ala. 2001); Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n,
Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Burrell v. City Univ. of N.Y., 995 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); Cooper v. Gustavus Adolphus Coll., 957 F. Supp. 191 (D. Minn. 1997); Storey v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 604 F. Supp 1200 (W.D. Wis. 1985). The following 6 district courts have
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that Title IX and Title VII function as parallel remedies. Fox
v. Pittsburg State Univ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (D. Kan. 2017); Winter v. Pa. State Univ., 172 F.
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This Article concludes that the expansive approach adopted most recently
by the Third Circuit is the one most faithful to the legislative history and
purpose of Title IX, as well as the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations of Title
IX. Part I of this Article provides a brief discussion of the legislative enactment,
scope, and purpose of Title VII and Title IX. Although the Supreme Court has
not directly addressed the issue explored in this Article, the Supreme Court has
issued several prior decisions interpreting Title IX, and the relevant decisions
also are discussed in Part I of this Article as instructive interpretative history.
The Article then turns in Part II to an analysis of the circuit split regarding
whether an employee has a private right of action under Title IX for
employment discrimination. It concludes in Part III by relying on legislative
history for the conclusion that Congress intended Title IX to serve as a parallel
remedy for eradicating the pervasive sex discrimination that existed throughout
educational institutions at the time of its enactment.
II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TITLE VII AND TITLE IX
A. Title VII’s Origin and Structure
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted as a comprehensive civil rights
package consisting of eleven separate titles.24 It was enacted pursuant to
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment,25 and the initial intended beneficiaries of this legislation were
African-Americans.26 Specifically, the economic conditions of AfricanAmericans had declined significantly in the late 1950s due to increasingly high
unemployment rates, and there were growing concerns about the increasing
number of violent racial riots in the South.27 Therefore, one of the legislative
objectives of the Civil Rights Act was to assure “equality of . . . opportunities
and remove [existing] barriers” for African-Americans,28 and this goal is
reflected in the statutory structure of this Civil Rights Act. Title II of the Civil

Supp. 3d 756 (M.D. Pa. 2016); AB v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 224 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Bedard v. Roger Williams Univ., 989 F. Supp. 94 (D.R.I. 1997); Henschke v. N.Y. Hosp.–Cornell
Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Broussard v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. & Univs., No.
92-581, 1993 WL 70203 (E.D. La. Mar 8, 1993).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012).
25. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367 (1978).
26. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
27. Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty Years of Compromise: How the Caps on Damages in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 Codified Sex Discrimination, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 249, 255–56 (2014).
28. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
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Rights Act of 1964 prohibited racial discrimination in commercial
establishments open to the public,29 whereas Title IV promoted the
desegregation of public schools,30 and Title VI prohibited discrimination on the
basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving
federal funding.31
The provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were even more
ambitious as they broadly strove to eliminate employment discrimination
among private employers.32 Moreover, Congress expanded the protected
characteristics of Title VII well beyond race and color discrimination to also
offer protection on the basis of national origin, religion, and sex.33 With the
addition of sex as a protected characteristic under Title VII, it became the first
major piece of federal legislation to offer civil rights protection to women.34
Despite the monumental accomplishment in enacting Title VII, the original
text of the statute contained several significant limitations that were enacted to
achieve the compromise necessary to secure its passage. Two of these
limitations provide important historical context to the current debate. First,
although the text of Title VII prohibited both public and private employers from
committing employment discrimination, the statute contained a significant
exemption excusing educational institutions completely from compliance.35
This provision, found in Section 702, stated in its original form, that “[t]his title
shall not apply to . . . an educational institution with respect to the employment
of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such
institution.”36 Thus, employees of educational institutions were not protected
from discrimination and educational institutions were “free, as far as Title VII
was concerned, to discriminate in [their] employment practices.”37
Second, Section 705 of Title VII created the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and charged it with the responsibility of preventing
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012).
30. Id. § 2000c.
31. See id. § 2000d et seq.
32. See id. § 2000e et seq.
33. Id.
34. See Zehrt, supra note 27, at 256.
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 410 (2nd Cir. 1975) (evaluating the Title
VII claims brought by two female faculty members and describing the individual effectiveness of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act for these plaintiffs); EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp.
152, 157 (D. Mass. 1975) (discussing the claims for injunctive relief and reinstatement brought by the
EEOC on behalf of two female faculty members who were fired and the protections now afforded by
the 1972 amendments to Title VII).
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unlawful employment practices, but the original statute gave the EEOC no
enforcement power,38 essentially asking the commission “to kill an elephant
with a fly gun.”39 One of the goals of the original statutory design was for the
EEOC to achieve prompt conciliation of employment disputes through
“persuasion,” thereby ensuring the prompt return of workers to the workforce.40
Thus, Title VII required all claimants to first file a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC, or an equivalent state agency, within either 90 or 210 days of the
alleged unlawful employment practice.41 This administrative process provided
the EEOC with an opportunity to investigate the charges and resolve them
through negotiation.42 Congress later amended Title VII and expanded these
deadlines slightly to 180 and 300 days depending on the existence of a state
agency, again ratifying the original ideal of encouraging prompt resolution of
claims.43 This opportunity for the EEOC to attempt prompt conciliation was so
integral to the statutory design of Title VII that the Supreme Court later deemed
it a prerequisite to filing a private lawsuit, and a claimant’s failure to satisfy
these administrative requirements of Title VII precluded subsequent
litigation.44 Moreover, if the EEOC failed to achieve conciliation, the remedies

38. See Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (detailing the legislative
history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act including the different proposals to provide the
EEOC with enforcement power).
39. See Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical
Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1,
32 (1977) (quoting Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1967, at 1, col. 6 (statement of Stephen N. Shulman, Chairman,
EEOC)).
40. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372–74 (1979) (discussing
that “[u]nder Title VII, cases of alleged employment discrimination are subject to a detailed
administrative and judicial process designed to provide an opportunity for nonjudicial and nonadversary resolution of claims. . . . At several different points, the statutory plan prevents immediate
filing of judicial proceedings in order to encourage voluntary conciliation.”); Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (explaining that “Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 . . . to assure equality of employment opportunities. . . . Cooperation and voluntary
compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal. To this end, Congress created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state
and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would have an
opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved
party was permitted to file a lawsuit.”); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a).
41. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(d); see also 110 CONG. REC. 12,724–25 (1964) (statement of
Sen. Humphrey) (explaining that the deferral to state agencies is based on federalism concerns, namely,
to preserve states’ historical control over employment relationships).
42. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a) et seq.
43. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 103, 105
(1972).
44. See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832 (1976).
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available to the plaintiff in federal court were minimal, limited to equitable
relief, including reinstatement and backpay,45 and attorney’s fees,46 and thus
provided little financial incentive to litigate the action after the conclusion of
the administrative process.
Congress attempted to remedy both of these limitations in Title VII through
the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.47 This statute,
enacted on March 24, 1972, amended Title VII by providing the EEOC with
the authority to enforce Title VII through increased investigative power48 and
the ability to institute civil actions against employers named in the charge of
discrimination.49
Additionally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 substantially
revised Section 702 of Title VII by eliminating the exemption for educational
institutions.50 Senator Cranston, one of the co-sponsors of the bill in the Senate,
explained the necessity for this revision to Title VII:
The existing exemption for employers of educational
institutions is also eliminated by S. 2515. There are at present
over 120,000 educational institutions, with approximately 2.8
million teachers and professional staff members and another
1.5 million nonprofessional staff members. Yet all of these
employees are, at present, without an effective Federal remedy
in the area of employment discrimination. As in other areas of
employment, statistics for educational institutions indicate that
minorities, and particularly women, are precluded from the
more prestigious and higher paying positions and are relegated
to the more menial and lower paying positions. I believe it is
essential that these employees be given the same opportunity
to redress their grievances as are available to other employees
in the private sector.51
Southern opposition to this portion of the Equal Opportunity Act centered
around a desire to remove religious institutions entirely from Title VII’s
provisions.52 When efforts to achieve complete exemption for religious
employers failed, their strategy shifted to negotiating a compromise that
45. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g).
46. Id. § 706(k).
47. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 §§ 3–5.
48. Id. § 5 (amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 707(e)).
49. Id. § 4(a) (amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(f)(1)).
50. Id. § 3.
51. 118 CONG. REC. S4,931 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1972) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
52. See George P. Sape & Thomas J. Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 860 (1972).
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permitted qualifying religious employers, including religious educational
institutions, to give employment preferences to members of their own religion,
thereby permitting them to discriminate only on the basis of religious
preference.53 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act codified this narrow
exemption for religious employers by amending Section 702.54
Not only did the Equal Employment Opportunity Act’s amendment of
Section 702 ensure that most employees of educational institutions were
protected by Title VII, but it also significantly expanded the coverage of Title
VII to two additional groups of employers. First, it modified Title VII’s
definition of the term employer to include all state and local governmental
employers.55 The result of this amendment was estimated at that time to extend
coverage of Title VII to approximately ten million additional employees.56
Second, it modified the small business exception by lowering the number of
employees from twenty-five to fifteen that an employer needed to be exempt
from compliance,57 adding an “estimated six million private industry
employees to [the] EEOC’s jurisdiction.”58 Thus, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act strove to improve the effectiveness of Title VII by not only
giving the EEOC enforcement power, but also by simultaneously increasing the
number of employees protected from discrimination.
As it stands today, Title VII currently allows a victim of intentional
discrimination to recover both compensatory and punitive damages from her
employer, although these damages are capped collectively in accordance with
the employer’s size.59 The addition of damages as an available remedy to
victims of discrimination pursuing claims under Title VII was achieved through

53. The Joint Conference Report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 explained
the history behind the amendment to Section 702: “The Senate Amendment eliminated the present
exemption from Title VII for educational institutions. Also, the Senate provision expanded the
exemption for religious organizations from coverage under this title with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion in all their activities instead of the present limitation to religious
activities. The House bill did not change the existing exemptions. The House receded.” S. REP. No.
92-681, at 16 (1972) (Conf. Rep.).
54. See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166–67
(4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276–78 (9th Cir. 1982); McClure
v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972).
55. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a),(f) (2012)).
56. See Hill, supra note 39, at 52.
57. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 § 2 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b),(d)
(2012)).
58. Hill, supra note 39, at 52.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012).
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the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.60 This was a substantial
modification to Title VII, both imposing financial consequences to employers
who failed to comply with its antidiscrimination mandate and providing victims
of discrimination with financial compensation to make them more fully
whole.61
B. Title IX’s General Language and Judicial Expansion
Approximately three months after Congress passed the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress enacted Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.62 Although both Title IX and Title VII prohibit
discrimination, the statutes differ significantly in scope, source of
Congressional power, remedies, and structure.
First, whereas Title VII “aim[ed] broadly to eradicate discrimination
throughout the economy” by comprehensively prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of a number of characteristics,63 the scope of Title IX was limited to
eradicating sex discrimination in education.64 This narrower scope is
understandable given the impetus for the enactment of Title IX. Specifically,
Title IX was enacted in response to “extensive hearings held in 1970 by the
House Special Subcommittee on Education” that raised awareness of
“pervasive discrimination against women with respect to educational

60. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (damages provisions codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012)).
61. See Zehrt, supra note 27, at 251.
62. Title IX was enacted on June 23, 1972, via the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972).
63. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
64. See 118 CONG. REC. S5,803 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“Mr.
President, one of the great failings of the American educational system is the continuation of corrosive
and unjustified discrimination against women. It is clear to me that sex discrimination reaches into all
facets of education—admissions, scholarship programs, faculty hiring and promotion, professional
staffing, and pay scales. Indeed, the recent ‘Report on Higher Education’ funded by the Ford
Foundation concluded: Discrimination against women, in contrast to that against minorities, is still
overt and socially acceptable within the academic community. The only antidote is a comprehensive
amendment such as the one now before the Senate. [This Amendment] is broad but basically it closes
loopholes in existing legislation relating to general education programs and employment resulting from
those programs. . . . [T]he heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in
educational programs receiving Federal funds. The amendment would cover such crucial aspects as
admissions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment, with limited exceptions.”).

ZEHRT, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

TITLE IX: PARALLEL REMEDY

4/22/2019 9:24 AM

711

opportunities.”65 Moreover, since the sole focus of these hearings concerned
sex discrimination in education, Congress applied Title IX’s provisions only to
educational recipients of federal funding.66
Title IX and Title VII also differ in their source of Congressional power,
and the Supreme Court has indicated this difference is a significant one.67
Congress enacted Title IX pursuant to its powers under the Spending Clause.68
This Spending Clause legislation is made in the form of a “contract: in return
for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions.”69 Whereas Title VII is “framed in terms of an outright prohibition”
given its grounding under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment; in contrast, Title IX “is framed in terms of a condition.”70 During
the debate in the House of Representatives regarding the Education
Amendments Act, Representative Mink explained the rationale for enacting
Title IX under the Spending Clause:
Any college or university which has [a] . . . policy which
discriminates against women applicants, . . . is free to do so
under [Title IX] but such institutions should not be asking the
taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination.
Millions of women pay taxes into the Federal treasury and we
collectively resent that these funds should be used for the
support of institutions to which we are denied equal access.71
Accordingly, the Supreme Court explained that Congress had the following
two purposes in enacting Title IX: “to prevent the use of federal dollars to
support discriminatory practices . . . [and] ‘to provide individual citizens
effective protection against those practices.’”72

65. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing 118 CONG. REC. S5,804
(daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)); accord N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512, 523 n.13 (1982).
66. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
67. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286–87.
68. Congress subsequently enacted other antidiscrimination statutes under its Spending Clause
powers, including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)), and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-135, § 303, 89 Stat. 728–29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (2012)). See Charles F.
Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory Model for Defining “Discrimination,” 70 GEO.
L.J. 1, 36 (1981).
69. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 182 (2005).
70. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286.
71. 117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971).
72. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)).
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Moreover, Title VII and Title IX provide different statutory remedies. Title
VII expressly provides an individual with a private right of action against their
employer,73 but Title IX does not.74 In the event an educational institution is
found in violation of Title IX, the only express remedy provided in the statute
is an administrative one: the termination of federal funding.75
Despite the narrower scope of Title IX, the Supreme Court has frequently
declared that Congress chose broad language in prohibiting sex discrimination76
and that courts must interpret the statute with “a sweep as broad as its
language.”77 The core of Title IX’s prohibition of sex discrimination is found
in Section 901(a) and states: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance . . . .”78
This portion of Title IX was modelled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, with the word “sex” substituted in Title IX for the word “race” that
was written into Title VI.79 The similarities between Title VI and Title IX do
not end with the antidiscrimination provision, however. Specifically, neither
statute expressly includes a private right of action. Instead, both provide the
termination of federal funding as the only stated remedy. 80
Based on the similarities in statutory design and structure, the Court has
often interpreted Title IX as consistent with Title VI.81 For instance, the Court
has implied a private right of action into both statutes.82 This implied right of
action breathed new life and expansion into Title IX, as it expanded the statute’s
sole enforcement power from federal agencies and placed part of it into the
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012).
74. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680–83.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
76. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173 (observing that in “all of these [previous] cases, we relied on the
text of Title IX, which . . . broadly prohibits a funding recipient from subjecting any person to
discrimination on the basis of sex”) (internal quotations omitted).
77. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); see Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694–95, 694 n.16.
80. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 695–96.
81. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 258–59 (2009); N. Haven, 456 U.S. at
528–29.
82. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 716–17 (interpreting Title IX to include a private right of action);
Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 597 (1983) (observing that a private
cause of action under Title VI was “implied by the judiciary rather than expressly created by
Congress”).
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hands of individuals.83 Scholars have speculated that the Court’s recognition
of an implied right of action was partially a practical one, shaped by the reality
that agency enforcement had proven ineffective.84 Specifically, the government
“ha[d] never cut off . . . funding to punish an educational institution for
violating Title IX.”85 Moreover, even if it had terminated funding, there were
serious concerns about whether this extreme remedy would advance the
statutory purposes of achieving gender equality in education or would instead
cause harm to victims of sex discrimination.86
The original private right of action permitted by the Court in Cannon v.
University of Chicago provided fairly limited remedies, however, and allowed
the plaintiff to request only injunctive and equitable relief.87 Undoubtedly, this
relief provided greater protection to an individual victim than the termination
of funding because the court could order the educational institution to cease its
discriminatory conduct or policy.88 However, the Court’s creation of this
implied right of action generated additional questions. For instance, just as
Title IX did not expressly provide for a private right of action, it also was silent
as to whether other remedies were available to victims of discrimination.89
The Supreme Court again expansively interpreted Title IX in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools by unanimously reaching two holdings. First,
the Court construed Title IX to include a cause of action for sexual

83. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703.
84. R. SHEP MELNICK, THE TRANSFORMATION OF TITLE IX: REGULATING GENDER EQUALITY
IN EDUCATION 15 (Brookings Institution Press, 2018); accord Implied Rights of Action to Enforce
Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378, 1404 (1978).
85. MELNICK, supra note 84, at 47.
86. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704–05 (commenting that the termination of funding is “severe and
often may not provide an appropriate means of accomplishing the . . . purpose if merely an isolated
violation has occurred”); N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 552 (Powell, J., dissenting) (observing that the “cutoff
of funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program, will not remedy the
injustice”); accord U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL TITLE VI ENFORCEMENT TO ENSURE
NONDISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS 40 (1996) (observing that “[a]lthough
fund termination may serve as an effective deterrent to recipients, it may leave the victim of
discrimination without a remedy. Fund termination may eliminate entirely the benefit[s] sought by the
victim.”).
87. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998) (citing Cannon, 441 U.S.
at 705 n.38, 710 n.44, 711) (clarifying that “when the Court first recognized the implied right under
Title IX in Cannon, the opinion referred to injunctive or equitable relief in a private action . . . but not
to a damages remedy”).
88. N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 552–53 (Powell, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the “cutoff of
funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program, will not remedy the injustice to
the employee.”).
89. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.
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harassment.90 The sexual harassment claim in Franklin was not brought by an
employee, however. Instead, the plaintiff in Franklin was a high school student
who alleged that a teacher and coach created a hostile work environment for
her during school.91 Second, the Court held that Title IX’s implied cause of
action included the availability of compensatory damages for intentional sex
discrimination.92 Acknowledging that the text of Title IX was silent with regard
to the specific remedies available, the Court examined the general “state of the
law when the Legislature passed Title IX”93 and concluded that the common
law at that time “regarded the denial of a remedy as the exception rather than
the rule.”94
Finally, while Title IX and Title VI share many similarities, they are not
identical.95 One of these differences warrants discussion here. Specifically,
Title VI contains the following important exception that is absent from Title
IX: “Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action
under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any
employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor
organization except where a primary object of the Federal financial assistance
is to provide employment.”96
This provision in Title VI has been construed consistently to mean that Title
VI regulates “employment only in limited circumstances.”97
Given that this exception is absent from Title IX, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare relied on this statutory distinction when it promulgated
the following formal regulations in 1975 that prohibited sex discrimination in
employment:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
90. 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); see Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005)
(acknowledging that Title IX “does not mention sexual harassment” but citing Franklin for the
proposition that “we have held that sexual harassment is intentional discrimination encompassed by
Title IX’s private right of action”).
91. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63.
92. Id. at 74.
93. Id. at 71; see also Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173.
94. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71; accord Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284 (conceding that this approach to
remedies “entails a degree of speculation” but explained that “[b]ecause the private right of action
under Title IX is judicially implied, we have a measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme
that best comports with the statute.”).
95. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)–(9) (2012) (identifying nine programs and organizations
that are exempt from Title IX), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (containing no exemptions).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (2012).
97. Title IX Legal Manual, supra note 4, at § I.
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discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideration,
or selection therefor, whether full-time or part-time, under any
education program or activity operated by a recipient which
receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance.98
Moreover, the Supreme Court upheld these regulations as a valid
interpretation of Title IX in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell.99 In
reaching this decision, the Court expansively interpreted the text of Title IX yet
again, concluding that employees constitute persons within the meaning of its
prohibition that “no person may be discriminated against on the basis of
gender.”100 Although the North Haven case is instructive regarding whether
employees fall within the protected class under Title IX, the Court did not
discuss whether private judicial actions were available to these plaintiffs.101
Specifically, the plaintiffs in North Haven complained administratively of sex
discrimination in educational employment, by filing complaints under Section
1682 of Title IX with the Department of Education, rather than filing
complaints in judicial proceedings.102 Therefore, the Court did not consider the
specific issue of whether these plaintiffs could recover damages under Title IX
from their educational employers by pursuing private litigation.
Thirteen years later, the Court interpreted the scope of Title IX to permit at
least some employees to pursue a judicial proceeding for damages. 103 In
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Court allowed a high school
basketball coach to pursue a retaliation claim.104 The plaintiff in Jackson did
not contend that he had been the victim of disparate treatment on the basis of
his gender. Instead, he claimed that he had been stripped of his coaching duties
because he complained of sex discrimination on behalf of the girls’ basketball
team.105 Writing for the majority in a 5–4 decision, Justice O’Connor
acknowledged that the text of Title IX did not expressly mention retaliation, yet
the Court found this omission immaterial.106 The Court interpreted the
prohibition of sex discrimination in Title IX to encompass retaliation, even
98. 34 C.F.R. § 106.51(a)(1) (1975).
99. 456 U.S. 512, 538 (1982).
100. Id. at 520.
101. Id. at 518 (explaining that the lawsuits involved in this case were brought by the employers
who sought declaratory and injunctive relief that the regulations issued by HEW were invalid).
102. Id. at 517–18 (explaining that Elaine Dove, a tenured teacher, and Linda Potz, a guidance
counselor, both filed complaints with HEW).
103. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 182 (2005).
104. Id. at 178.
105. Id. at 171–72 (complaining about the girls’ basketball team not receiving equal funding or
access to athletic equipment and facilities).
106. Id. at 175.
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when “the victim of the retaliation [is not] . . . the victim of the discrimination
that is the subject of the original complaint.”107
The Court explained the importance of teachers and coaches being
protected from retaliation, declaring that they were uniquely situated to identify
and report certain types of discrimination and observing that if their reports
were not protected under Title IX, “the teacher would have no recourse if he
were subsequently fired for speaking out.”108 In other words, the plaintiff’s
conduct presumably was not protected by other statutes, such as Title VII,
because the underlying discrimination was committed against students and not
employees.109 Therefore, in the Jackson case, Title IX was the sole avenue of
relief rather than an alternative remedy.
The dissent in Jackson emphasized that Congress expressly included
separate retaliation provisions in other discrimination statutes and concluded
that “[a] claim of retaliation is not a claim of discrimination on the basis of
sex.”110 The majority responded to this argument with a sweeping statement
that has implications in the context of employment discrimination: “Title IX’s
beneficiaries plainly include all those who are subjected to ‘discrimination’ on
the basis of sex.”111
Finally, the language of Title IX is silent with regard to whether private
individuals are required to exhaust an administrative process as litigants must
do before filing a lawsuit under Title VII.112 The Supreme Court has briefly
addressed this issue twice but, admittedly, both cases involved only claims
brought by students.113 In both cases, however, the Court implied that

107. Id. at 179.
108. Id. at 180–81.
109. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 178 (2011) (holding that “the term
‘aggrieved’ in Title VII incorporates [the zone of interests] test, enabling suit by any plaintiff with an
interest arguably sought to be protected by the statutes, while excluding plaintiffs who might
technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are unrelated to the statutory
prohibitions in Title VII.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
110. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 185, 187 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 179 n.3.
112. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 707 n.41 (1979) (“[W]e are not persuaded that
individual suits are inappropriate in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies.”); Fitzgerald v.
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009) (“Title IX has no administrative exhaustion
requirement. . . . Plaintiffs can file directly in court under its implied private right of action and can
obtain the full range of remedies.”).
113. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680 (involving a plaintiff who was denied admission to medical school
and claimed the denials was based on her sex); Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 250 (allegations brought by
female student and her parents contesting inadequate response by school to reports of student on
student harassment).
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administrative exhaustion was not required under Title IX. First, in Cannon,
the Court stated in a footnote that “we are not persuaded that individual suits
are inappropriate in advance of exhaustion of administrative remedies.”114
Thirty years later, in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, the Court
observed that “Title IX has no administrative exhaustion requirement . . . .
Plaintiffs can file directly in court [under Title IX’s implied private right of
action], and can obtain the full range of remedies.”115
Thus, the Court’s expansive judicial interpretations in Cannon, North
Haven, and Jackson, and its conclusion that claimants do not have an
administrative exhaustion requirement under Title IX, have paved the way for
the current disagreement over the relationship between Title VII and Title IX.
Given the Court’s decision in North Haven that Title IX prohibits sex
discrimination in educational employment, can an employee of an educational
institution elect to sue her employer for compensatory damages solely under
Title IX and thus avoid the conciliatory administrative process in Title VII?
Alternatively, did Congress intend that Title VII would preempt these monetary
claims and, therefore, serve as the sole avenue for employment discrimination
claims against educational institutions? It is to this disagreement that this
Article now turns.
III. THE UNSETTLED DEBATE OVER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE IX
AND TITLE VII
In four federal circuits, employees of academic institutions may sue their
employers for sex discrimination in employment under either Title VII or Title
IX.116 As previously discussed, both statutes prohibit sex discrimination in
employment, so an employee of a qualifying educational institution may bring
parallel claims for sex discrimination under both statutes, or may elect to litigate
under only one of them. In these circuits, proceeding solely under Title IX has
its advantages. These litigants have a more direct route to the courthouse
because they need not satisfy Title VII’s administrative procedures with the
EEOC or a possible deferral to a state agency.117 Moreover, these litigants also
have the potential to recover greater compensatory damages under Title IX

114. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 707 n.41.
115. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 255.
116. See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3rd Cir. 2017); Ivan v. Kent State
Univ., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll. 31 F.3d 203
(4th Cir. 1994); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
117. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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given these awards are not subject to caps as are awards under Title VII.118 On
the other hand, in two circuits, employees of educational institutions are forced
to bring their employment discrimination claims under Title VII, because these
courts have declared that Title VII is the “exclusive avenue of relief” for a
monetary recovery.119 This Article now will explore the justifications and legal
authority supporting each approach.
A. Title VII is the Exclusive Remedy
Two circuit courts of appeals have concluded that Title VII “provides the
exclusive remedy for individuals alleging employment discrimination on the
basis of sex in federally funded educational institutions.”120 Although these
initial decisions by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits were issued over twenty years
ago, numerous district courts outside these jurisdictions have found their legal
justifications persuasive.121
The first decision, issued by the Fifth Circuit in Lakoski v. James, involved
a female professor who sued her former employer, a university, for sex
discrimination after her tenure application had been rejected for the third time
and her teaching contract was not renewed.122 This plaintiff neither filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC, nor included a Title VII claim in her
complaint.123 Instead, she challenged her adverse employment actions under
Title IX, state tort law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.124 The primary relief requested
by the plaintiff in her complaint was compensatory and punitive damages; the
plaintiff did not pursue an administrative claim for the termination of
funding.125 Therefore, the sole issue before the court was whether the plaintiff
had a private right of action under Title IX to recover damages for employment
discrimination.

118. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S.
60, 74 (1992).
119. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91
F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996).
120. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753; accord Waid, 91 F.3d at 862 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that “Title
VII provided the only way by which Waid could obtain make-whole relief.”).
121. See cases cited supra note 23.
122. 66 F.3d at 752.
123. Id. at 753.
124. Id. at 752.
125. See id. at 752–53.
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The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was foreclosed from receiving
any monetary recovery for employment discrimination under Title IX126 and
the court offered three primary justifications for its conclusions that Title VII
preempts claims for money damages under Title IX. First, the Fifth Circuit
emphasized the difference in statutory structure between Title IX and Title VII.
The court noted that Congress established a comprehensive administrative
scheme when it enacted Title VII.127 Yet, the court observed, Congress
provided no express private right of action when it subsequently enacted Title
IX.128 While acknowledging that the Supreme Court implied a cause of action
into Title IX in its decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Fifth Circuit
distinguished that decision by noting it involved a claim by a “student” and not
“a claim of employment discrimination by an employee.”129 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court’s prior Title IX decisions did not
answer the question of whether an employee could bring a private cause of
action under for sex discrimination in the employment context.130
Second, the differences in statutory structure were especially significant,
according to the Fifth Circuit, given the legislative history surrounding the
enactment of Title IX.131 Specifically, the amendments to Title VII, adopted
through the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, occurred just three
months before the enactment of Title IX, and this provided strong evidence of
Congressional intent to preclude a private right of action under Title IX for
employment discrimination.132 The Fifth Circuit explained that an earlier
version of Title IX, H.R. 7248, which was the original bill proposed in the
House, included a provision to remove the education exemption from Title
VII.133 Once Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
the court reasoned that this enactment “obviated the need for [Title IX] to close
[this] loophole in Title VII. The final bill enacted by Congress omitted the
language amending Title VII but left the provision prohibiting sex
discrimination in federally funded educational institutions.”134
126. Id. at 753 (noting that “[w]e limit our holding to individuals seeking money damages under
Title IX . . . for employment practices for which Title VII provides a remedy, expressing no opinion
whether Title VII excludes suits seeking only declaratory or injunctive relief.”).
127. Id. at 754.
128. Id. at 755.
129. Id. at 754.
130. Id. at 754–55.
131. Id. at 756–57.
132. Id. at 756.
133. Id. at 756–57.
134. Id. at 757.
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Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded after examining both the statutory design
and legislative history that Congress did not intend to “[offer] . . . Title IX to
employees of federally funded educational institutions so as to provide a bypass
to Title VII’s administrative procedures.”135 Instead, the court reasoned:
Congress chose two remedies for the same right, not two rights
addressing the same problem. Title VII provided individuals
with administrative and judicial redress for employment
discrimination, while Title IX empowered federal agencies that
provided funds to educational institutions to terminate that
funding upon the finding of employment discrimination. In
other words, Congress intended to bolster the enforcement of
the pre-existing Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination in
federally funded educational institutions; Congress did not
intend Title IX to create a mechanism by which individuals
could circumvent the pre-existing Title VII remedies.136
Third, the Fifth Circuit concluded that its interpretation of Title VII in this
case was compelled by two prior decisions of the Supreme Court, Great
American Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny,137 and Brown v. General
Services Administration.138 In Novotny, the Supreme Court held that the
deprivation of a right created by Title VII could not form the basis of a claim
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).139 The Court in Novotny discussed Title
VII’s “comprehensive plan,” the requirement that claimants file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, and the underlying Congressional purpose “to
encourage voluntary conciliation.”140 If plaintiffs could bring these claims
through § 1985(3) rather than Title VII, the Supreme Court observed that the
“complainant could avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific
[requirements]” of Title VII, and “completely bypass the administrative
process, which plays such a crucial role in the scheme established by Congress
in Title VII.”141 Similarly, in Brown, the Supreme Court concluded that a
federal employee could not bring a claim against the United States under 42
135. Id. at 758.
136. Id. at 757; accord Ludlow v. Nw. Univ., 79 F. Supp. 3d 824, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (finding
persuasive “the Fifth Circuit’s legislative history analysis showing that Title IX was intended to be a
supplemental remedy in the educational setting—i.e. a ‘big stick’ that federal agencies could use
against allegations of sex discrimination, separate and apart from an individual’s right to sue under
Title VII.”).
137. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
138. 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976).
139. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378.
140. Id. at 373–74.
141. Id. at 375–76.
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U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination in his employment.142 Instead, the
Supreme Court concluded that Section 717 of Title VII provided the exclusive
avenue of relief to federal employees complaining of employment
discrimination.143 Thus, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Novotny and Brown to conclude that Title VII likewise provides
the exclusive remedy for monetary damages to employees of federally funded
educational institutions complaining of sex discrimination.144 Given its
conclusion that Title IX did not provide monetary damages for employment
discrimination, and that the plaintiff chose not to pursue a remedy under Title
VII, the Fifth Circuit concluded that judgment should be entered in favor of the
plaintiff’s employer.145
Numerous district courts were persuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in
Lakoski and, accordingly, these courts rejected similar monetary claims for
employment discrimination made by employees of federally funded
educational institutions under Title IX.146 These courts were careful to limit the
scope of their holdings by observing “that Title VII does not preempt all Title
IX claims of employment discrimination, but only those claims that seek relief
available under Title VII (i.e, claims for money damages would be preempted
while claims for injunctive relief related to federal funding, as not provided for
by Title VII, would not).”147 They also advanced additional policy concerns
about permitting employment discrimination claims to proceed under Title IX.

142. Brown, 425 U.S. at 828 n.10.
143. Id. at 834.
144. Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 755 (5th Cir. 1995).
145. Id. at 758.
146. See Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1996) (following Lakoski
and holding that “Title VII provided the only way” plaintiff could recover); see also Schultz v. Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. of W. Fla., No. 3:06cv442-RS-MD, 2007 WL 1490714, at *3 (N.D. Fla. May 21,
2007) (concluding “consistent with the weight of authority, that the ‘precisely drawn, detailed
enforcement structure’ and ‘comprehensive remedial scheme’ that is Title VII preempts the more
general remedy under Title IX.”); Urie v. Yale Univ., 331 F. Supp. 2d 94, 97–98 (D. Conn. 2004)
(observing that “[m]ost courts that have taken up the issue agree that Title IX was not intended to
enable employees of educational institutions complaining of gender discrimination to bypass the
remedial scheme Congress established in Title VII.”); Cooper v. Gustavus Adolphus Coll., 957 F.
Supp. 191, 193 (D. Minn. 1997) (declaring that “most courts have rejected” these types of claims under
Title IX and concluding that this court agrees “that there is no private action for damages available to
a college employee under Title IX for sex discrimination”).
147. Gibson v. Hickman, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1481, 1484 (M.D. Ga. 1998); accord Kemether v. Pa.
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 740, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (noting that the Third
Circuit has not addressed this issue, but following Lakoski and concluding that plaintiff’s employment
discrimination claims under Title IX are barred “to the extent that [those] claims could have been
brought under Title VII”).
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If employment discrimination suits for monetary damages were permitted
under Title IX, these suits would circumvent Title VII’s statutory cap on
damages, as well as Title VII’s administrative requirements.148 This would
allow “plaintiffs who work at federally funded [educational] institutions
unfettered ability to bring what are in reality Title VII sexual discrimination
[suits] without adhering to the same rules required of every other employment
discrimination plaintiff in the country.”149
In more recent decisions, district courts following the exclusive remedy
approach also have distinguished the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson v.
Birmingham Board of Education,150 and determined that it does not compel a
different result when analyzing whether Title IX provides a monetary remedy
to employees who are victims of sex discrimination.151 Concluding that the
Supreme Court has not addressed the specific question of whether Title VII
preempts Title IX when employees seek monetary relief for sex
discrimination,152 these courts limit the scope of the Court’s decision in Jackson
to recognizing only a private cause of action under Title IX for retaliation.153 It
is true, these courts concede, that the plaintiff in Jackson was a high school
employee.154 Nonetheless, it is significant that the Supreme Court reached this
result after observing that the plaintiff in Jackson had “no recourse” for
retaliation except under Title IX.155 On the other hand, plaintiffs who sue their
148. See, e.g., Drisin v. Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 1:16-cv-24939-WILLIAMS/TORRES,
2017 WL 3505299, at *7 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2017); Torres v. Sch. Dist. of Manatee Cty., No. 8:14-cv1021-T-33TBM, 2014 WL 4185364, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2014); Gibson, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1484;
Burrell v. City Univ. of N.Y., 995 F. Supp. 398, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
149. See, e.g., Gibson, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1484; Drisin, 2017 WL 3505299, at *7.
150. 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005).
151. Vandiver v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., No. 4:03-CV-00834 GTE, 2007 WL 2973463, at *15
(E.D. Ark. Oct. 9, 2007) (agreeing that “Jackson should not be read to expand private rights of action
under Title IX to include claims of employment discrimination which have no connection to the rights
of students, as the Supreme Court’s seminal cases regarding Title IX private rights of action relate to
claims by students against funding recipients.”); accord Drisin, 2017 WL 3505299, at *5 (conceding
that “[c]entral to the split among the federal courts is a disagreement over the parameters of Title IX
in connection with [several] Supreme Court cases.”).
152. Drisin, 2017 WL 3505299, at * 4; Torres, 2014 WL 4185364, at *5; Schultz v. Bd. of Trs.
of the Univ. of W. Fla., No. 3:06cv442-RS-MD, 2007 WL 1490714, at *2 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2007).
153. Vandiver, 2007 WL 2973463, at *15.
154. Ludlow v. Nw. Univ., 79 F. Supp. 3d 824, 832 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
155. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180–81 (observing that “if Title IX’s private right of action [did] not
encompass retaliation claims, the teacher would have no recourse if he were subsequently fired for
speaking out” and therefore “the underlying discrimination would go unremedied”); accord Lauren
Stewart, Circumventing Congress’s Comprehensive Schemes: The Third Circuit Allows Employees of
Educational Institutions to Bypass Title VII and Bring Claims under Title IX in Doe v. Mercy Catholic
Medical Center, 59 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 168, 186 (2018) (distinguishing Jackson on the
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educational employers for sex discrimination under Title IX have full recourse
under Title VII, and thus no need “to look beyond the comprehensive scope of
remedies and actions available . . . under Title VII.”156
For approximately ten years, the interpretation that Title VII provides the
exclusive monetary remedy to these educational employees seemed to be the
prevailing view and it remains the majority view among district courts.157 As
set forth below, the alternate view, that Title IX and Title VII are parallel
remedies, has gained momentum in recent years.
B. Title IX and Title VII are Parallel Remedies
Four different Circuit Courts of Appeals and numerous federal district
courts have permitted employees of federally funded educational institutions to
bring employment discrimination claims under Title IX by adopting a much
broader view of the relationship between Title IX and Title VII. 158 In these
courts, Title IX and Title VII are analogous but parallel remedies, and Title IX
functions as an additional safeguard for preventing sex discrimination.159
grounds that “plaintiff was not the direct victim of sex-based discrimination and therefore likely did
not have a claim under Title VII.”).
156. Ludlow, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 833.
157. See, e.g., Schultz, 2007 WL 1490714, at *3 (concluding that “the weight of authority” has
concluded that “Title VII preempts the more general remedy under Title IX”); Urie v. Yale Univ., 331
F. Supp. 2d 94, 97–98 (D. Conn. 2004) (observing that “[m]ost courts that have taken up the issue
agree that Title IX was not intended to enable employees of educational institutions complaining of
gender discrimination to bypass the remedial scheme Congress established in Title VII.”); Cooper v.
Gustavus Adolphus Coll., 957 F. Supp. 191, 193 (D. Minn. 1997) (declaring that “most courts have
rejected the theory that employees of an educational institution have an implied cause of action for
damages under Title IX.”).
158. See Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3rd Cir. 2017); Ivan v. Kent State
Univ., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996); Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203
(4th Cir. 1994); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Fox v. Pittsburg State
Univ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1112 (D. Kan. 2017); Winter v. Pa. State Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 756 (M.D. Pa.
2016); Kohlhausen v. SUNY Rockland Cmty. Coll., No. 7:10-CV-3168, 2011 WL 1404934 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 9, 2011); AB v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 224 F.R.D. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Bedard v. Roger
Williams Univ., 989 F. Supp. 94 (D.R.I. 1997); Broussard v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. & Univs., No.
92-581, 1993 WL 70203 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 1993).
159. See, e.g., Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (concluding “that Title VII is not the exclusive
remedy for gender-based employment discrimination claims and that ‘Title IX . . . function[s] as an
additional safeguard against gender-based discrimination. . . .’”); AB, 224 F.R.D. at 153 (finding “that
Title IX was intended by Congress to function as an additional safeguard against gender-based
discrimination in the context of federally funded education programs; notwithstanding the possibility
of other available remedies, including without limitation those available under Title VII.”); accord
Henschke v. N.Y. Hosp.–Cornell Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp. 166, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that “Title
IX demonstrates an intent on the part of Congress to have Title IX serve as an additional protection
against gender-based discrimination.”).
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Under this interpretation, an employee of an educational institution may either
file a lawsuit under both statutes for the same violation, or they may elect to sue
their educational employer under only one of them and this solitary claim may
consist solely of Title IX. These courts have offered three primary justifications
for their view that Title IX is a parallel remedy: the text of Title IX; guidance
from three Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title IX; and the Court’s
preemption analysis in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,160 which
explores the relationship between Title VII and another civil rights statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1981.161
First, these courts have emphasized that the text of Title IX broadly declares
that “no person” shall be discriminated against on the basis of sex.162 Thus,
these courts have concluded that employees are persons, within the protection
of Title IX, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in North Haven.163
Given the statute’s expansive language, these courts also have relied on the
Supreme Court’s repeated instruction that the scope of Title IX must “sweep as
broad as its language.”164
These courts also have relied upon the silence in the text of Title IX,
namely, that Title IX does not explicitly define its relationship with other
statutes.165 These courts have construed the silence to weigh against
preemption, explaining “that if Congress intended for Title VII to preempt
employment discrimination claims under Title IX, it could have drafted Title
IX, which was enacted after Title VII, to state as much.”166

160. See 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
162. Doe, 850 F.3d at 561; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 896; Preston, 31 F.3d at 205; Winter, 172 F.
Supp. 3d at 775.
163. See, e.g., Fox, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1125 (D. Kan. 2017) (citing N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v.
Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982)).
164. Doe, 850 F.3d at 555 (citing N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 521); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of
Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 175 (2005) (quoting N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 521); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 896 (quoting
N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 521); see also Bedard v. Roger Williams Univ., 989 F. Supp. 94, 97 (D.R.I.
1997).
165. Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 775; Kohlhausen v. SUNY Rockland Cmty. Coll., No. 7:10-CV3168, 2011 WL 1404934, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011).
166. Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 775; accord Kohlhausen, 2011 WL 1404934, at *12 (explaining
that “[j]ust as Congress could have said that it intended Title IX to supplement remedies available
under Title VII, Congress could also have explicitly indicated that the 1972 Amendments would secure
Title VII as the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination. Congress said neither. Thus, given
the broad scope of Title IX, and the Supreme Court’s recognition that multiple, often overlapping,
remedies exist for employment discrimination, this Court concludes that Title IX is not preempted
where a plaintiff also brings a claim under Title VII.”).
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Second, courts following the parallel remedy approach assert that this
approach is more faithful to several Title IX decisions issued by the Supreme
Court, namely the Cannon, North Haven and Jackson decisions.167 Although
these courts acknowledge that the Supreme Court has not answered the precise
question of whether Title IX and Title VII have concurrent applicability, 168
these courts conclude that that “the Supreme Court’s ‘next logical step’” is “to
recognize a private cause of action under Title IX for employment
discrimination.”169
For instance, these courts emphasize that in Cannon, the Supreme Court
recognized a private remedy “not explicitly limited to . . . student[s]” but
instead spoke in more general terms, articulating a remedy “‘in favor of
individual persons’ or ‘persons discriminated against on the basis of sex.’”170
Twenty-five years later, these courts reiterate, the Supreme Court in Jackson
extended Title IX’s private right of action to include an employee complaining
of retaliation.171 These courts observe that the Supreme Court in Jackson
specifically recognized that “Title VII is a vastly different statute” than Title
IX, yet “the Supreme Court did not indicate that Title VII displaced relief under
Title IX.”172 Thus, these courts have declared, that “Jackson and the decisions
before it make plain: When a funding recipient retaliates against a ‘person,’
including an employee, because she complains of sex discrimination, that’s

167. See, e.g., AB v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 224 F.R.D. 144, 151–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(identifying a circuit split and explaining that “central to this split is a disagreement over the degree to
which the parameters of Title IX have been established by three Supreme Court cases.”); accord
Winter, 172 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (describing that the “disagreement over the scope of Title IX . . . has
been established by three (3) Supreme Court cases.”).
168. See, e.g., Fox, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (recently characterizing as “unsettled” the issue of
whether Title VII displaces relief under Title IX and stating that the Court has not yet concluded
whether “title VII displaces relief under Title IX”).
169. Bedard, 989 F. Supp. at 97; accord Doe, 850 F.3d at 559 (deciding whether “Cannon
extends” to plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims).
170. Kohlhausen, 2011 WL 1404934, at *11 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677,
691, 694 (1979)); accord Broussard v. Bd. of Trs. for State Colls. & Univs., No. 92-581, 1993 WL
70203, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 1993) (concluding that “Defendants’ attempt to limit the holding of
Franklin to its facts (i.e., a claim by a student as compared to an employee in this case) is without
merit. No such distinction was relied on by the Franklin Court in reaching its decision.”).
171. Doe, 850 F.3d at 562 (stating the Supreme Court in Jackson “allowed the employee’s
retaliation claim to proceed under Cannon.”); accord Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.
167, 184 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (indicating that the majority “holds that the private right of
action under Title IX . . . for sex discrimination that it implied in Cannon . . . extends to claims of
retaliation.”).
172. Fox, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 (quoting Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175).
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‘intentional discrimination’ based on sex, violative of Title IX and actionable
under Cannon’s implied cause of action.”173
The Court’s decision in North Haven is “particularly illuminating” to this
legal issue,174 these courts posit, because in this case, the Supreme Court
“effectively expanded the meaning of the words ‘no person’ found in section
1681(a) to include employees of the institution receiving federal funds.”175
Additionally, they emphasize that the Court in North Haven specifically
addressed the issue of the availability of overlapping remedies for employment
discrimination, but dismissed those objections:
The Court rejected the argument that Title IX shouldn’t extend
to private employment because employees “have remedies
other than those available under Title IX,” like Title VII. Even
if “alternate remedies are available and their existence is
relevant,” it rejoined, “Congress has provided a variety of
remedies, at times overlapping, to eradicate employment
discrimination.”176
The courts also have observed that the North Haven decision identified
several examples of employment decisions that constitute sex discrimination
prohibited by Title IX.177 These examples, although dicta, provide supporting
evidence that the Supreme Court would likely extend Cannon’s “private right
of action [to] employees and students alike.”178
Finally, courts adopting the parallel remedy approach often rely on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., for the
proposition that the Court “has already rejected the argument that Title VII is

173. Doe, 850 F.3d at 563–64.
174. Id. at 562.
175. Bedard v. Roger Williams Univ., 989 F. Supp. 94, 97 (D.R.I. 1997).
176. Doe, 850 F.3d at 561 (quoting N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 n.26
(1982)); accord Kohlhausen v. SUNY Rockland Cmty. Coll., No. 7:10-CV-3168, 2011 WL 1404934,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011).
177. Bedard, 989 F. Supp. at 97 (explaining that “a female employee who works in a federally
funded education program is ‘subjected to discrimination under’ that program if she is paid a lower
salary for like work, given less opportunity for promotion, or forced to work under more adverse
conditions than are her male colleagues.”) (quoting N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 521).
178. Kohlhausen, 2011 WL 1404934, at *11; accord Bedard, 989 F. Supp. at 97 (stating that
“this court agrees with those courts which predictively view the Supreme Court’s ‘next logical step’ as
being to recognize a private cause of action under Title IX for employment discrimination against a
federally funded education program.”) (quoting Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D.
Tex. 1994)).
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the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination.”179 In Johnson, the
plaintiff sued his employer for race discrimination under both Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981.180 Section 1981, like Title IX, has no administrative
requirement prior to filing suit, yet the Supreme Court held in Johnson that it
was possible for a claimant to file suit under both Title VII and Section 1981.181
The Supreme Court observed that these two statutory claims were
“related, . . . directed to most of the same ends, [and] are separate, distinct, and
independent.”182 Moreover, similar arguments were made in Johnson that
allowing an independent claim under Section 1981 would permit the
circumvention of Title VII’s administrative requirements.183 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court dismissed these concerns, acknowledging that Title VII was
“design[ed] as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious
discrimination in employment” but holding that such design clearly does “not
deprive[]” the individual “of other remedies he possesses and [he] is not limited
to Title VII in his search for relief.”184
Not only has the parallel remedy approach been increasingly favored by
courts, but it also has been adopted by the Department of Justice.185 In its Title
IX Legal Manual, the Department of Justice states that it “takes the position
that Title IX and Title VII are separate enforcement mechanisms. Individuals
can use both statutes to attack the same violations.”186 As justification for this
position, the Department of Justice explains that this interpretation is
“consistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions on Title IX.”187
The argument that the Supreme Court’s Title IX decisions support the
parallel remedy approach is a persuasive one, not only for the holdings and
explanations given by the Court in these decisions, but also for the Court’s
approach when implying a private right of action into a civil rights statute such
as Title IX. As the Supreme Court has explained numerous times, when
179. Fox v. Pittsburg State Univ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1123 (D. Kan. 2017); accord Doe, 850
F.3d at 560; Kazar v. Slippery Rock Univ. of Pa., 679 F. App’x 156, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2017) (Shwartz,
J., concurring).
180. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 456 (1975).
181. Id. at 460.
182. Id. at 460–61.
183. See Doe, 850 F.3d at 560; Fox, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1123; Kazar, 679 F. App’x at 164–65
(Shwartz, J., concurring).
184. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459.
185. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant and Urging
Reversal at 26–27, Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (2016) (No. 16-1247), 2016 WL
3227568.
186. Title IX Legal Manual, supra note 4, at § IV.B.2.
187. Id.
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“determining whether to infer a private [right] of action from a federal statute,
our focal point is Congress’ intent in enacting the statute.”188 In both the
Cannon and North Haven decisions, the Supreme Court considered the
legislative history of Title IX as part of its determination of Congressional
intent. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the legislative history here for
any insight into whether Congress intended Title IX to provide a private remedy
for employment discrimination. As explained below, the legislative history
shows that Congress intended Title IX to prohibit sex discrimination in
employment, and there is no indication that Congress intended that Title IX
employment discrimination claims would be preempted by Title VII.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT
CONGRESS INTENDED TITLE IX TO SERVE AS A PARALLEL REMEDY FOR
EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE IX
In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted several civil rights statutes that
did not expressly include a private remedy.189 Both Title IX and Title VI are
examples of civil rights statutes without express private rights of action, and the
Supreme Court has found implied private rights of action under both.190 Given
the prevalence of civil rights statutes enacted during these years,191 in Cort v.
Ash the Supreme Court articulated a test involving the consideration of four
factors which were “relevant” to the question of whether courts should imply a
right of action from a federal statute.192 In its decision, the Court did not
188. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988); accord Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch.
Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252 (2009) (explaining that “[t]hese cases establish that ‘[t]he crucial
consideration is what Congress intended.’”) (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012).
189. See Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79
Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.); Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012);
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 794, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 794 et. seq. (2012)).
190. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688–89 (1979) (implying a private right of action
for the petitioner, a student, under Title IX); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (observing
that it is “beyond dispute that private individuals may sue” under Title VI to address allegations of
intentional discrimination).
191. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); See generally Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil
Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View, supra note 84 (explaining that “the Supreme Court made no
explicit attempt to summarize the criteria for implying private rights [of action] until its 1975 decision
in Cort v. Ash” and demonstrating that each of the factors “were based on principles drawn from the
dominant strand of Supreme Court precedent dealing with implication”).
192. In Cort v. Ash, the Court held that four factors were “relevant” when “determining whether
a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one.” 422 U.S. at 78. These factors
were: “[f]irst, is the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted’—that
is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of
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indicate whether all factors were required or whether any of them carry more
significance than others.193
Four years later, the Supreme Court clarified that an analysis of all four
factors was not necessary in every case, and declared that “[t]he central inquiry
remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by
implication, a private cause of action.”194 Accordingly, scholars have
concluded that the Court in later decisions “shift[ed] away from the multifactored Cort test used in Cannon” and replaced it with a congressional intent
analysis.195
In Thompson v. Thompson, Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
reiterated that the “focal point is Congress’ intent in enacting the statute” and
the four factors were merely “guides” to be used “along with other tools of
statutory construction.”196 Justice Marshall also explained the necessary
evidence required to support a finding of congressional intent, as follows:
Our focus on congressional intent does not mean that we
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law?” Id. (internal citations omitted).
193. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23 (1979) (rejecting
the argument that it must consider each of the factors articulated in Cort); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575–76 (1979) (acknowledging that the decision in Cort “did not decide that
each of these factors is entitled to equal weight” and concluding that the Court’s analysis may end after
an examination of the text and legislative history).
194. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 23–24; Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575–76; accord California v.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) (stating that “[c]ases subsequent to Cort have explained that the
ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.”); accord Fitzgerald v.
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252 (2009) (instructing courts that when deciding whether a
statute is an exclusive remedy, the proper inquiry is whether “Congress intended a statute’s remedial
scheme to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert the claim[s]”).
195. Douglas P. Ruth, Title VII & Title IX = ?: Is Title IX the Exclusive Remedy for Employment
Discrimination in the Educational Sector?, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 185, 208 (1996); accord
Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 67, 87-88 (2001) (analyzing the Court’s decisions interpreting Cort v. Ash, and concluding that
even “the Justices bickered about whether Cort v. Ash retained any vitality”); H. Miles Foy, III, Some
Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts,
71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 565 (1986) (observing that “[i]n several decisions in the late 1970s and early
1980s the Court rearranged, restated, or simply ignored the other three factors of the Cort v. Ash
analysis. Congressional intent became the primary, and the ultimate, concern.”) (footnotes omitted).
196. 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988); see also id. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that “[i]t
could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, converting one of its four factors
(congressional intent) into the determinative factor.”).
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require evidence that Members of Congress, in enacting the
statute, actually had in mind the creation of a private cause of
action. The implied cause of action doctrine would be a virtual
dead letter were it limited to correcting drafting errors when
Congress simply forgot to codify its evident intention to
provide a cause of action. Rather, as an implied cause of action
doctrine suggests, “the legislative history of a statute that does
not expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be
equally silent or ambiguous on the question.” We therefore
have recognized that Congress’ “intent may appear implicitly
in the language or structure of the statute, or in the
circumstances of its enactment.” The intent of Congress
remains the ultimate issue, however, and “unless this
congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the
statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the
essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply
does not exist.”197
In accordance with these decisions, it is appropriate, therefore, to analyze
whether Congress intended Title IX to serve as an additional remedy for
employment discrimination. As set forth below, the language of the statute, as
well as the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of
Title IX, support the view that Congress so intended.
First, Congressional intent to provide a private cause of action may be
gleaned from the text of Title IX.198 The text of Title IX “broadly prohibits a
funding recipient from subjecting any person to ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis
of sex.’”199 The textual analysis regarding the meaning of the word “person”
in Title IX need not be extensive or novel because the Supreme Court held in
North Haven that an employee qualifies as a “person” within the meaning of
the statute.200 The Court observed that “Congress easily could have substituted
‘student’ or ‘beneficiary’ . . . if it had wished to restrict the scope of” Title IX,
and yet Congress chose the word “person” instead.201 Therefore, the language
of Title IX supports the conclusion that Title IX protects employees from
discrimination on the basis of sex.202

197. Id. at 179 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).
198. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (explaining that “our analysis must begin with the
language of the statute itself”) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979)).
199. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005).
200. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520 (1982).
201. Id. at 521.
202. Id. at 522.
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The next task is to analyze “the Act’s legislative history for evidence as to
whether Congress meant somehow to limit the expansive language” of Title
IX.203 An examination of the legislative history of Title IX shows, however,
that from the very beginning, Title IX was viewed as a parallel remedy,
intended to strengthen the powers of the EEOC to eradicate sex discrimination.
Title IX was the product of over six years of legislative effort designed to
bolster the prohibitions of sex discrimination in Title VII.204 As previously
discussed, when Title VII was enacted in 1964, it contained significant
limitations; two are particularly relevant to the current discussion. First, Title
VII contained an Educational Exemption found in Section 701, which rendered
all employees of educational institutions unprotected from employment
discrimination.205 Second, even for those employees who were protected by
Title VII, the protection had limited benefit because Congress did not give the
EEOC any enforcement power, preferring instead to require the EEOC to
investigate and attempt conciliation of all charges of discrimination.206
Following the enactment of Title VII, the EEOC was overwhelmed with
investigating and processing the number of charges that were filed.207
Specifically, the anticipated number of charges “had been vastly
underestimated; it was predicted to receive about two thousand charges in its
first year, but the actual figure was 8,852” including an “unexpectedly high
number of sexual discrimination charges.”208 Given the EEOC’s lack of
enforcement power, heavy caseload, limited personnel, and small budget,
scholars have observed that the results obtained by “the EEOC [were]
mixed . . . and the enthusiasm that initially greeted the enactment of Title VII
and the creation of the EEOC waned.”209
In 1965, President Johnson signed Executive Order 11,246 which
prohibited federal contractors from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin.210 Several women’s advocacy groups, including the
National Organization for Women, subsequently urged President Johnson to

203. Id.
204. See id. at 523.
205. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964).
206. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
207. See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 671, 674 (2005).
208. See id. at 674–75.
209. See id. at 676.
210. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 28, 1965).
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extend similar protection to women.211 President Johnson amended this
Executive Order effective October 13, 1968, to include discrimination based on
sex, and renamed it as Executive Order 11,375.212
Dr. Bernice R. Sandler, who was then employed as a part-time professor at
the University of Maryland, is largely credited as the first person to utilize
Executive Order 11,375 for the benefit of women in educational institutions.213
Despite the existence of seven vacancies for full time faculty in her department
at the University of Maryland, Dr. Sandler was rejected for consideration
because she was female, and she knew that the employment discrimination she
had experienced within academic institutions was not unusual.214 Dr. Sandler
thus began researching ways to achieve change and when she discovered the
executive order, she “made the connection that[,] since most universities and
colleges had federal contracts[,] they were forbidden from discriminating in
employment on the basis of sex.”215 She recently had joined a women’s
advocacy group, the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL), and she
approached them about using Executive Order 11,375 to improve conditions
for women in educational institutions.216 Thereafter, Dr. Sandler was named
Chair of WEAL’s Federal Action Contract Compliance Committee, and in that
capacity, she filed administrative charges of sex discrimination against over 250
universities and colleges with the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare.217
Representative Edith Green (D., Ohio) served on WEAL’s Advisory Board
and, thus, she was aware of the complaints filed by WEAL.218 She also knew
very little action had been taken by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare to investigate those complaints,219 and she believed that more
permanent protection against sex discrimination in education was needed given
how easily executive orders may be revoked by subsequent presidents.220
211. Max Frankel, Johnson Signs Order to Protect Women in U.S. Jobs from Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1967, at 11.
212. See Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (Oct. 17, 1967).
213. Bernice R. Sandler, Title IX: How We Got it and What a Difference it Made, 55 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 473, 474 (2007).
214. Id. at 474.
215. See Bernice R. Sandler, “Too Strong for a Woman”—the Five Words That Created Title
IX, BERNICE SANDLER (1997), http://www.bernicesandler.com/id44.htm [https://perma.cc/5S53MSTA].
216. See Sandler, supra note 213, at 475.
217. See id. at 475–76.
218. See id. at 476–77.
219. See id. at 476.
220. See Sandler, “Too Strong for a Woman,” supra note 215.
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Therefore, she proposed H.R. 16098 on February 19, 1970.221 Section 805 of
H.R. 16098 is largely considered the precursor to Title IX, and it ambitiously
aimed to eradicate all sex discrimination in educational institutions. 222 The
original version of Section 805 proposed to attack sex discrimination in the
following three ways. First, Section 805(a) would amend Title VI by adding
the word “sex” to Section 601.223 Second, Section 805(b) would amend Title
VII by removing the exemption for educational institutions found in Section
702.224 Third, Section 805(d) would remove the exemption found in the Equal
Pay Act for executive, administrative, and professional employees.225 The goal
of these statutory amendments was to eliminate widespread sex discrimination
in three interrelated areas of higher education: admissions, employment, and
salary.
After its initial proposal, H.R. 16098 was referred to the House Committee
on Education and Labor.226 Representative Green chaired the Subcommittee
on Education, and in this capacity, she organized seven days of congressional
hearings throughout June and July of 1970.227 These historical hearings are
largely considered the first congressional hearings on education and
employment of women.228
Much of the testimony documented widespread sex discrimination in the
employment of women in educational institutions. In her initial remarks at the
hearings, Representative Green provided statistical evidence documenting a
disparity among women in professional occupations, as well as a disparity in
salary and rank among faculty at universities.229 These disparities in
educational employment were confirmed by numerous witnesses throughout
the hearings.230 For instance, Jean Ross, Chair of the Legislative Committee of
the American Association of University Women, stated that her organization
221. H.R. 16098, 91st Cong. § 805 (1970).
222. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523 n.13 (1982); id. at 544 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
223. H.R. 16098 § 805(a).
224. Id. § 805(b).
225. Id. § 805(d).
226. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the
Spec. Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong. 1 (1970) [hereinafter
Hearings].
227. See id. at I (documenting that the hearings were held on June 17, 19, 26, 29, and 30, and
July 1 and 31, 1970).
228. See Sandler, supra note 213, at 477.
229. See Hearings, supra note 226, at 2–3 (statement of Rep. Edith Green); accord Sandler,
supra note 213, at 477.
230. See Hearings, supra note 226, at 19, 131–32, 153, 614, 646.
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was “particularly aware of a situation in which proportionately few [women]
occupy top positions in either administration or teaching” and she further
complained that “the percentage of women on faculties has dropped seriously
in recent years from 30 percent in 1940 to 19 percent in 1969.”231 Similarly,
Wilma Scott Heide, Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Committee, shared statistics showing a disparity in rank among the few women
hired in educational institutions, namely that women faculty were employed in
mostly lower paying, non-tenured positions such as instructors and “only 4.7%
of the Full Professors” were women.232 Commissioner Heide also shared her
societal concerns that these figures suggest “to children that the teaching of
younger children is for women[,] but that leadership in education and training
of older youth and adults is for men.”233 Likewise, Dr. Ann Scott testified on
behalf of the National Organization of Women and shared the results of a recent
employment survey conducted specifically regarding the distribution of women
in faculty at the University of Buffalo.234 She testified the survey revealed that
“women comprise [only] 14 percent of the faculty, [and] . . . only 5 percent of
the full professors.” 235
Additionally, there was considerable testimony about the EEOC’s lack of
enforcement power236 and how modifications to all portions of the bill were
“urgently” needed “to broaden the present scope of guarantees of
nondiscrimination in programs and activities assisted by Federal moneys.” 237
For instance, Myra Ruth Harmon, President of the National Federation of
Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, Inc., explained that her
organization supported HR 16098 in large part due to proposed changes to the
Fair Labor Standards Act. She explained her organization’s view that the
Department of Labor, which enforced the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, had more enforcement power and authority to achieve change
than the EEOC. In other words, her testimony supported the view that Title VII
was merely one potential option for combatting sex discrimination in
231. Id. at 21 (statement of Jean Ross, Chairman, Legislative Committee, American Association
of University Women).
232. Id. at 131 (statement of Wilma Scott Heide, Comm’r, Pennsylvania Human Relations
Committee).
233. Id. at 132 (statement of Comm’r Heide).
234. See id. at 148–153 (statement of Dr. Ann Scott, Chairman, Campus Coordinating
Committee, National Organization for Women).
235. Id. at 153.
236. See id. at 621, 629 (statement of Rep. Shirley Chisholm) (confirming the ineffectiveness of
the EEOC and stating that “unless [federal agencies] have enforcement powers, they are ignored and
impotent”).
237. See id. at 8 (statement of Ms. Myra Ruth Harmon, President, National Federation of
Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, Inc.).
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employment and was not as effective as other statutory remedies, including the
Fair Labor Standards Act. In pertinent part, she testified:
At present, Title VII, section 703(a)(1), of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination in hiring,
discharging, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
including that of compensation.
However, the EEOC, which is burdened with administering
Title VII has an overload of casework. Moreover, the EEOC
has very little power . . . .
The EEOC’s authority is limited to conciliation efforts.
On the other hand, the Equal Pay Act is administered by the
Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor.
This agency is generally able to obtain compliance.
If there is a refusal to comply or deliberate violation of the law,
the Secretary of Labor may obtain a court injunction to restrain
[a] continued violation or withholding of back wages legally
due.
The Secretary of Labor may also bring suit for the back wages
upon written request of an aggrieved employee. . . .
Indeed, the strength and effectiveness of enforcement
proceedings under the Fair Labor Standards Act was one of the
compelling reasons for BPW’s support for attaching the equal
pay bill to the Fair Labor Standards Act.238
The EEOC Chairman, William H. Brown, III, testified that Title VII’s
current statutory scheme was “seriously deficient” in a number of ways.239
First, he confirmed the ineffectiveness of the EEOC and attributed this
ineffectiveness to heavy caseloads and lack of enforcement power.240 For
instance, he documented that “[i]n its four years of existence, the Commission
has received over 44 thousand charges.”241 He further explained that “25

238. Id. at 10.
239. Id. at 623 (statement of William H. Brown, III, Chairman, EEOC).
240. See id. at 629.
241. Id. (explaining that “27 thousand charges . . . were recommended for investigation,
reasonable cause was found in 63% of the cases that completed the decision process, but in less than
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percent, approximately, of complaints coming into the Commission are
complaints based on sex.”242 Mr. Brown also testified that the numbers of
charges alleging sex discrimination were increasing, stating that “[o]ver 12,000
charges received by the commission since its inception have alleged disparate
treatment based on sex, and lately that percentage has risen. During the first 10
months of fiscal year 1970, 2,887 charges received were based on sex with no
letup in sight.”243 Mr. Brown noted that these numbers would have been even
higher without the exemption in Title VII for educational institutions because
“it seems clear that little progress has been made in the [last] 12 years” and it
was likely “that the situation has gotten worse.”244
Second, Mr. Brown testified Title VII had also proven ineffective in
combatting sex discrimination through enforcement litigation brought by the
Justice Department. Specifically, Mr. Brown confirmed that the EEOC had
referred numerous claims of egregious sex discrimination to the Justice
Department “with a recommendation from our Commission that suits be
instituted.”245 Mr. Brown testified, however, that “[i]t was never done.”246 He
explained that these “cases would languish over at Justice, and many times we
would get them back 2 or 3 years later with nothing being done.”247 He
attempted to defend the Justice Department’s actions, stating their office was
“very limited in the number” of personnel.248 When asked, however, by
Representative Green if the Department of Justice had instituted actions based
on other classifications such as race discrimination, Mr. Brown confirmed that
they had, estimating that number to be approximately 50 during the previous
few years.249 Chairman Green expressed outrage at the Justice Department’s
half of these cases were we able to achieve either a partially or totally successful conciliation. [Thus,
i]t can readily be seen that the existing law is seriously deficient.”).
242. Id. at 638.
243. Id. at 624, 638.
244. Id. at 625.
245. Id. at 634.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 635.
248. Id. at 636.
249. See id. (statement of Chairman Brown in response to questions by Rep. Green). The
following exchange occurred about the number of actions instituted involving classifications other than
sex:
Mrs. Green: How many cases are there on the basis of race discrimination?
Mr. Brown: I don’t have the exact figures, over the years, I imagine more than 50 cases
have been instituted.
Mrs. Green: Based on race discrimination?
Mr. Brown: That would be race and everything else. There may be national origin in there.
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refusal to institute lawsuits to enforce Title VII’s prohibition of sex
discrimination stating “that history is going to record this as the biggest copout of the century. They assert themselves in other cases of discrimination but
not in sex discrimination cases. It seems to me since they are required by the
law to enforce equally, when they choose to ignore the enforcement of the law
based on sex discrimination, they themselves can be accurately accused of
discrimination.”250
This ineffectiveness in litigating sex discrimination cases is particularly
meaningful when considered along with the Department of Justice’s position
on H.R. 16098.251 Mr. Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General with the
Department of Justice, testified before the subcommittee and confirmed the
nonexistence of enforcement lawsuits to combat sex discrimination.252 Mr.
Leonard also explained that the Department of Justice did not support H.R.
16098, and he proposed an alternative solution.253 That proposal rejected
Subsection 805(a) of H.R. 16098, which would amend Title VI by adding the
word “sex” to the text of the statute, instead preferring to enact separate
legislation that prohibited only sex discrimination in educational programs. 254
He explained that the new legislation would be “patterned after . . . Title VI”
and he discussed that this proposed design included similar enforcement
provisions:
The means of enforcement would be identical to those
provided in section 602 of title VI—(1) administrative
proceedings leading to possible termination of Federal
assistance, or (2) other means authorized by law, including
court suits. All of the procedural and other safeguards
contained in section 602 would be incorporated into the new
statute.255

Mrs. Green: But not a single one on sex discrimination?
Mr. Brown: Not to my knowledge.
Mrs. Green: It seems to me that their preference for pursuing cases involving race or
national origin can’t be interpreted as anything except discrimination on the part of the
Justice Department. Id.
250. Id. at 621, 636 (statement of Chairman Brown); accord id. at 64 (Report of the President’s
Task Force on Women’s Rights & Responsibilities).
251. See id. at 677–92 (statement of Jerris Leonard, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Division,
Department of Justice).
252. See id. at 682.
253. See id. at 677.
254. Id. at 678.
255. Id.

ZEHRT, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

738

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

4/22/2019 9:24 AM

[102:701

Moreover, Mr. Leonard declared that the proposal also had other
similarities to Title VI as it would “cover virtually all colleges, universities, and
public school systems” and that the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare would have primary enforcement authority.256
Mr. Leonard also disclosed, however, that there was a key distinction
between Title VI and this proposal, namely, that the new proposal would not
contain Title VI’s exemption, found in Section 604, for employment practices.
Mr. Leonard explained:
Unlike Title VI, the measure we propose would not contain an
exemption for employment practices. Considering the record
established before this subcommittee, such coverage of
employment practices by our proposal seems appropriate.
Again, it should be noted that this legislation would apply to
almost all of the institutions of higher education, both public
and private, and to almost all public elementary and secondary
school systems.257
Further, Mr. Leonard explained that the proposal would prohibit a wide
variety of sex discrimination, including employment discrimination. He
testified:
Among the areas in which sex discrimination would be
forbidden are the following: availability of scholarship and
fellowships; admission to graduate programs; and hiring,
compensation, and promotion of faculty and staff members.258
Moreover, Mr. Leonard agreed, during questioning by Representative
Brademas (D., Indiana), that one of the benefits of enacting a separate bill to
prohibit sex discrimination was that such a bill “would more clearly cover”
employment practices of educational institutions.
Mr. Brademas: Now, you also said that unlike title VI, your
proposal of a separate bill would not exempt employment
practices. Do I assume that one of the justifications of your
wanting a separate bill rather than an amending of title VI is
you are contending that your proposal is thereby stronger in
that it would cover employment practices? I do not want to put
words in your mouth; I am just trying to understand why you
prefer one rather than the other.
Mr. Leonard: I think that what we are really trying to say is that
our suggestion is more directly responsive to the record that
this subcommittee has made. . . . I think that what we are

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. (emphasis added).
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really saying is that a separate bill which would include not
only the prohibitions as to the programs themselves, but also
as to the employment activities that are associated with those
programs, would more clearly cover the kind of problems
brought out in testimony and evidence which you have
developed.259
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Mr. Leonard’s testimony offered
conclusive evidence of how the Department of Justice viewed the relationship
between Title VII and the EEOC’s role in combatting sex discrimination in
educational employment. Specifically, the Department of Justice strongly
opposed Subsection 805(b) of H.R. 16098, the provision that would amend
Title VII to remove the exemption for educational institutions.260 Mr. Leonard
explained that this statutory revision to Title VII was now unnecessary:
[O]ur proposal to prohibit sex discrimination in all federally
assisted education programs would apply to sex discrimination
in employment. Accordingly, at this time, I see no need for
amending title VII.261
In other words, the Department of Justice’s proposal did not grant exclusive
power to the EEOC over claims of sex discrimination in educational
employment. Rather, the objective of this proposal was just the opposite: it was
to place exclusive authority in the hands of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, who would solely enforce the prohibition of sex
discrimination in educational institutions. Therefore, the sole remedy for
claims of employment discrimination based on sex against educational
institutions would come from the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare under the Department of Justice’s proposal, and not the EEOC.
The Department of Justice was not the only organization that objected to
the amendment of Title VII as a way to solve the problem of sex discrimination
by educational institutions. Dr. Peter Muirhead, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, also “question[ed] whether
these provisions [the proposed amendments to Title VI and Title VII] are the
very best vehicle for expanding existing law in this area.”262 Dr. Muirhead felt
that neither amendment was necessary, because authority to enforce Executive
Order 11,246, as amended by Executive Order 11,375, had been delegated to
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and this included the

259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 686 (statement of Mr. Leonard in response to questions from Rep. Brademas).
See id. at 677.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 648 (statement of Dr. Peter Muirhead, Deputy Assistant Secretary, HEW).
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responsibility to investigate and remedy allegations of sex discrimination in
educational institutions.263 He explained:
Mr. Muirhead: By way of explanation on the matter of
amending Title VII, we might again call to the attention of the
chairman that Executive Order 11,246 does cover almost the
whole universe of higher education since the order covers those
institutions that are under Federal contracts. So that in dealing
with the employment practices of colleges and universities, the
Executive Order 11,246, as amended, would reach almost all
of the colleges and universities.
Mrs. Green: Do you feel that that Executive order gives you
authority to go in when an institution blatantly practices
discrimination in terms of hiring faculty members, and
awarding promotions?
Mr. Muirhead: We now have that authority, because it applies
to any college or university having a contract with the Federal
Government. If they are discriminating against women in any
part of their employment practices they would then be liable to
the provisions of this Executive Order.264
Here again, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare officially
opposed giving the EEOC exclusive authority over claims of sex discrimination
in educational institutions, and specifically wanted to retain the power to
resolve those claims, including employment discrimination claims.
Yet, Representative Green and other witnesses testifying before the
Subcommittee expressed concern about granting the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare exclusive authority over these claims.265
Representative Green questioned Dr. Muirhead and Mr. Kiely, one of his
colleagues from HEW, about HEW’s tenacity in investigating colleges and
universities suspected of violating the executive order. Mr. Kiely conceded that
since the amendment of the executive order in 1967, HEW had only opened
four investigations.266
HEW’s lack of tenacity in investigating complaints was confirmed by Dr.
Sandler, in her testimony as Chair of the Action Committee for WEAL, when
discussing the extensive complaints filed by WEAL against approximately 250
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 646–47.
Id. at 648 (statement of Dr. Muirhead in response to questioning from Rep. Green).
Id.
See id. at 649.
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colleges and universities.267 Dr. Sandler explained that WEAL had requested a
class action because the sex discrimination was so widespread within
educational institutions, and she submitted a copy detailing all of the individual
educational institutions that were specifically charged in WEAL’s
complaints.268 In Dr. Sandler’s opinion, HEW was not serious about enforcing
the executive order given that it had largely ignored all of these complaints.269
Moreover, although the executive order forbade sex discrimination in most
educational institutions, Dr. Sandler advocated against merely relying on the
executive order, explaining that it “does not have the status of law” because
“[i]t can be amended or suspended at the pleasure of a particular
administration.”270
This testimony from the 1970 hearings is crucial, contextual information
when viewing the actual enactment of Title IX and the ultimate amendments
Congress adopted to Title VII. This is particularly true here given the Supreme
Court’s designation of the “sparse” nature of the legislative history of the bill
actually enacted as Title IX.271 Senator Birch Bayh (D., IN) also served on
WEAL’s advisory board, and he introduced the language Congress enacted as
Title IX as a floor amendment to the larger 1972 education bill.272 Given the
language’s origins as a floor amendment, there were no formal committee
hearings or committee reports in the Senate related to this amendment.273 Under
these unique circumstances, the Supreme Court instructed in North Haven that
statements made by Senator Bayh, as “the sponsor of the language ultimately
enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute’s construction.”274
Despite the sparse nature of the legislative history, Senator Bayh makes
numerous, supportive references to the 1970 hearings held in the House
Subcommittee on Education by Representative Green.275 During Senator
Bayh’s remarks on the Senate floor, he specifically relied on testimony given

267. See id. at 308–10, 321 (statement of Dr. Bernice R. Sandler, Chairman, Action Committee
for Federal Contract Compliance in Education, WEAL).
268. See id. at 299, 308–10.
269. See id. at 303. WEAL subsequently filed an action in federal court against HEW seeking
enforcement of Title IX and Executive Order 11,375. See Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos,
879 F.2d 880, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
270. Hearings, supra note 226, at 303.
271. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 527 (1982).
272. Id. at 524; see 118 CONG. REC. S5,804 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
273. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893–94 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting the relative lack
of legislative history).
274. N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 526–27.
275. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. S5,804–05, S5,809–12 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972).
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at the 1970 hearings by Dr. Muirhead as well as Dr. Ann Scott.276 Further, in
support of his floor amendment, he submitted a paper written by Dr. Bernice
Sandler, entitled The Status of Women: Employment and Admissions, detailing
the number of charges of sex discrimination filed by the Women’s Equity
League with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare against colleges
and universities.277 Dr. Sandler had given similar testimony during the 1970
hearings and referenced those hearings throughout her paper.278 Therefore, the
1970 hearings clearly influenced not only Senator Bayh’s remarks made in
support of his proposed amendment, but also the language proposed in the
amendment itself.
Specifically, two aspects of Title IX’s statutory language were influenced
directly by the 1970 hearings. First, as the Supreme Court explained in North
Haven, the final bill adopted by the Conference Committee did not contain an
exemption for educational institutions.279 The Court found the removal of this
exemption from Title IX to be significant, declaring that this action was
“[e]xpressly a conscious choice [and] . . . suggests that Congress intended that
§ 901 prohibit gender discrimination in employment.”280 The testimony of Mr.
Leonard from the 1970 hearings confirms this conclusion from the Court.
Second, it is not just the removal of the exemption from Title IX that is
indicative of Congress’ intent to prohibit employment discrimination, but also
the codification of sex prohibitions into a statute separate from Title VI. The
language included in Senator Bayh’s floor amendment, which is the language
enacted by Congress, did not amend Title VI to add the word “sex” to the
statutory provisions, but instead enacted Title IX as an independent statute
prohibiting sex discrimination.281 Given that the Department of Justice
submitted the first proposal to codify the sex discrimination provisions into a
separate statute, its interpretation of the implications of such separate
codification should be considered persuasive. Mr. Leonard’s testimony
demonstrates that he believed that the proposal submitted by the Department of
Justice would cover employment claims. Mr. Leonard provided examples of
sex discrimination that would violate its provisions and these included “hiring,
compensation, and promotion of faculty and staff members.”282 When Mr.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id. at S5,805.
Id. at S5,809–10.
Id. at S5,810.
N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 528.
Id.
118 CONG. REC. S5,803, S5,808 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972); accord N. Haven, 456 U.S. at

524.
282. Hearings, supra note 226, at 678 (statement of Mr. Leonard).
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Leonard advocated for his proposal over the amendment of Title VI, he
explained that the proposal of a separate statute was “more directly responsive”
to the testimony given at the hearings and addressed “the[se] kind[s] of
problems.”283 The subcommittee had listened to days of testimony primarily
about widespread employment discrimination in educational institutions and a
proposal that failed to cover employment claims would not have been
responsive to the testimony at all.
Moreover, the testimony from the 1970 hearings also demonstrates that the
statutory scheme Congress ultimately enacted was intended to offer parallel
remedies for combatting sex discrimination. First, testimony at the hearings
from Dr. Muirhead indicated that the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare already was investigating charges of sex discrimination within
educational institutions pursuant to Executive Order 11,375, with the authority
to provide remedies to victims, including back pay.284 There is no indication
anywhere during the 1970 hearings that Congress intended to remove this
authority from HEW.
To the contrary, the testimony from Mr. Leonard, of the Department of
Justice, establishes just the opposite, and he proposed that additional authority
be granted to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare through the
enactment of a statute separate from Title VI forbidding sex discrimination.285
This statute would provide the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
with the additional authority to terminate federal funding and, thus,
strengthened this department’s ability to increase compliance. Therefore, it was
not necessary, according to Mr. Leonard, to amend Title VII to remove the
educational exemption if the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was
investigating such claims.286
There simply are no statements or testimony throughout the hearings from
the Department of Justice, the EEOC, or any witness or committee member
suggesting that the EEOC be given exclusive authority over the investigation
Moreover, the Justice
of claims against educational institutions.287
283. Id. at 686.
284. Id.
285. See supra notes 243–44 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
287. Indeed, Senator Bayh attempted in 1971 to address the problem of sex discrimination in
educational institutions by proposing an earlier amendment, Amendment 398 to S. 659, the Education
Amendments of 1971. Senator Bayh’s 1971 Amendment also did not include a proposal to amend
Title VII. 117 CONG. REC. 30155, 30399, 30404 (1971). Instead, Amendment 398 proposed amending
Title VI to add several separate sections, prohibiting sex discrimination by recipients of federal
funding, and Senator Bayh explained that enforcement, implementation, and judicial review of these
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Department’s proposal to shift responsibility to the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare sounds reasonable given the concerns expressed
throughout the 1970 hearings about the EEOC. Witnesses, including Mr.
Brown as Chairman of the EEOC, expressed frustration about the EEOC’s
inefficiency with processing and achieving conciliation with the volume of
charges that had been filed in its first four years.288 If the EEOC was
overwhelmed with the number of charges being filed at that time, and those
numbers would only increase if the educational exemption was removed, it
seems unlikely that Congress intended to place exclusive responsibility with
the EEOC for investigating these additional charges against educational
institutions.
Congress ultimately chose global and consistent reform in the area of sex
discrimination when it amended Title VII in 1972 to remove the exemption for
educational institutions, and three months later, enacted as Title IX as a statute
modeled after, but separate from, Title VI. These two statutes granted authority
respectively to the EEOC and HEW to investigate sex discrimination in
educational institutions, thereby ensuring that two agencies, rather than merely
one, would have a greater capacity to investigate the systemic sex
discrimination that was rampant in the 1960s and 1970s throughout educational
institutions. Given the testimony about pervasive employment discrimination
against women in educational institutions offered during the 1970 hearings
before the House Subcommittee on Education, and Senator Bayh’s frequent
reliance on this testimony in 1972 during his remarks in the Senate, there should
be no remaining doubt that Congress intended to extend protection for sex
discrimination to these employees. That Congress chose to extend parallel
protection under both Title VII and Title IX to these employees only increased
the probability of eradicating sex discrimination in educational institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
More than forty years have passed since the enactment of Title IX. Despite
numerous Supreme Court decisions broadly interpreting its prohibition of sex
discrimination, federal courts remain divided over the proper application of
Title IX in the employment context. To resolve this conflict, this Article closely
new provisions was intended to be “identical to those provided under title VI.” 117 CONG. REC. 30156,
30404 (1971). Although this amendment did not pass, the proposal provides additional evidence that
Senator Bayh initially intended to give the Department of Education, Health and Welfare primary
authority in enforcing the sex discrimination provisions, and in a similar manner to its authority to
enforce the then existing race discrimination provisions under Title VI. See generally N. Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523–25 n.13, n.14 (1982) (discussing Sen. Bayh’s 1971 proposal and
declaring that it “plainly was meant to proscribe discrimination in employment”).
288. See supra notes 230–32 and accompanying text.
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examined the legislative history of Title IX, in particular the 1970 hearings held
in the House Subcommittee on Education. Congress could have simply
amended Title VII to remove the exemption for educational institutions because
this provided employees of educational institutions with protection from
discrimination. Instead, Congress did more. Given the systemic employment
discrimination exposed by the hearings, Congress subsequently enacted Title
IX, thereby creating an independent and parallel remedy to Title VII that
imposed greater penalties on educational institutions committing intentional
sex discrimination. Accordingly, federal courts should allow claimants to
recover monetary damages against educations institutions by pursuing a Title
IX claim for employment discrimination.

